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Wed, 31 Aug 2005

Kutztown 13 31 Aug
The Kutztown incident is a very good example of "what not to do". Let's see if I can explain this and why I think that even attempting to impose "community service" might be a bad idea.

The basic situation: the school attempted to press felony charges against school children for repeatedly bypassing security functions installed by the school.

The problems:

  • Attempting to become the parent
  • Assuming all students are the same
  • Lack of due care and due diligence
  • Other problems

Attempting to become the parent

The parents cannot be held responsible for the actions of their children because it is the school that acted as "the parent" in this situation by putting an adult "tool" into the hands of a minor. Use of an adult tool, be it car, gun, or communications device requires a specific level of adult judgement. This is something that most minors do not have and it is also something that is not easily replaced by software, especially software purchased via a least-bidder contract.

The responsible adult(s) in this situation are still the school board and the teachers (those that gave the adult tools to the minors). Most parents do not understand computer technology/security or the related federal laws. Thus, the school became (and remains) the responsible party by being the knowledgeable "enabler" by putting an adult "tool" into the hands of minors and then not providing constant adult supervision.

Although the parents probably signed a permission slip, it's probable that they didn't understand the implications of that permission. I'm willing to bet even a poor lawyer could break the supposed contract in that permission slip.

Assuming that all students are the same

Regardless of the "we're all equal" tripe that is force-fed in most schools today, students differ. They have different/differing IQ's, religions, respect for authority, and upbringings. Occasionally (ahem) you'll have a student that is smart enough and motivated (peer pressure in high school usually will override ethics and authority) to take advantage of an opportunity. Peer recognition will usually cause this "seized opportunity" to be shared.

Believing that the installed protections were adequate enough to (to use a noun as a verb) countermeasure all students abilities and motivations, makes the school eligible for the InfoSec Darwin Awards, if such a thing ever exists. To maintain "security", your minimum protections must be sufficient to counter the most talented and badly motivated user, not the "average" user. 'Nuff said?

Lack of due care and due diligence

AKA "poor judgement". The school displayed poor judgement (lack of due care) by putting an adult "tool" into the hands of a minor and then neglecting to provide adequate supervision when the minor exercised that tool. Even though the school may have believed that it had practiced "due care" by installing various protections, it obviously didn't practice "due diligence".

"Due care" equates to taking the necessary precautions to prevent an incident (an instantiation of a risk). Obviously, the level of security was not sufficient to prevent an incident. That the incident was as severe as it was and that it involved so many students is an indication that there was a difference between perceived and actually required protections.

"Due diligence" is the practice of enforcing those precautions (countermeasures) and being able to prove their consistent enforcement over time (auditing, record keeping, etc.). What occurred didn't happen overnight. Who was reading the firewall/router logs? IM traffic is easy to detect. The school should have noticed when the first student started experimenting with his laptop.

"Due care" and "due diligence" also requires adjustment of countermeasures they reveal an inadequacy. The article indicates that the situation continued to exist, even after detentions, suspensions and "other punishments" (what the heck does that mean?). This means that the school only attempted to correct the situation by external measures (getting the parents involved). The school obviously failed to increase required physical, logical and administrative countermeasures.

"Adequate supervision" involves the phrases "consistent (and constant) supervision" and "adult-quality judgement". Believing that adult judgement can be replaced with software, especially when "physical security" is negated by allowing student custody of the laptops, is a serious mis-judgement.

Use of desktop machines in a formal classroom setting implies a certain level of integrity provided by constant physical security and near-constant physical presence of authority. This "advantage" was lost by issuing portable systems and allowing them to be taken out of the "secure environment". Even if possession of the laptops were restricted to the school, you can't assume that the 50 year-old part-time teacher would be able to recognize improper or illegal activity in study hall.

Other problems

Err... How about overreacting? The "zero tolerance" policy often quoted by public school officials is often a rationalization to vacate a school's responsibility/judgement or to hide their own complicity-due-to-negligence in a situation. In this case, all three might be involved.

Some of the security "tools" installed by the school may have been illegal. While it is permissive for a parent to invisibly monitor their child's online activity, serious questions should be asked when a school installs the ability to monitor students' activities on an individual basis. In other words, generic monitoring (watching proxy or router logs for suspicious activity) is generally permissible with prior notice. However, employing a "a remote monitoring function that let administrators see what students were viewing on their screens," without just cause (and usually a search warrant), is likely to be a felony in itself. Remember, we are not talking about parent-child or employer/employee relationships.

Parent-child relationships/responsibilities have created unique legal conditions which are not easily transferred to institution-child relationships/responsibilities. In this case, the school can probably be slapped with a "contributing to the delinquency of a minor" charge for not providing adequate supervision after facilitating (providing the tools of) the crime.

That the tools of the crime were provided by the school, that the object(s) of the crime was also school property, and that the perpetrators of the crime were school charges has created a very sticky situation for the school. The school exacerbated the situation by attempting to charge the students with felonies, thereby drawing the attention of national media.

Closing comments:

  • this "experiment" obviously has failed
  • attempting to "save face", as the article puts it, via imposed community service, risks yet more embarrassment
  • since this is a public school which accepts federal money and keeps digital records on its students, do you think FISMA or GLB applies?

joat: 12:00:00 31 Aug 2005


Tue, 30 Aug 2005

DNS6 30 Aug
I've attempted to talk about the following, off-and-on, for the last few years. Here's yet another attempt...

I'm likely to be completely off the mark with this but the DNS control argument may become a moot point (or an even bigger issue) with the adoption of IPv6. The U.S. keeps control of DNS space solely by the pseudo-rules-of-thumb known as "possession is nine-tenths of the law" and "majority rule". In other words, control is maintained solely by inertia and continued support of majority rule.

IPv6 changes the playing field because of the differing rates of adoption of the technology. A visit to the current 6bone will show that the ratio of English to non-English sites is much different than version 4 IP space. There is a slight risk that current infrastructure managers might attempt to use "majority rule" to start their own address infrastructure.

I say slight as such an action would require cooperation on a massive scale by parties who normally are very contentious, politically different and motivated by normally-opposing agendas (profit, control, ideologies, etc.).

I believe the situation to be quite binary. As long as the forces remain below a certain level, ICANN is likely to retain "control" (a poor term for it) of the DNS system. This is the most likely outcome.

However, if the level of contention goes above a certain point, or if opposing forces change the turn-over point in the equation by cooperating with each other, we might see a very fractious DNS system. Fortunately, if this occurs, the condition won't last long (in geological time) as systems do not normally support unstable conditions for long. Remember:

  • chaos requires complete lack of control
  • oscillation requires a very specific form of control (feedback) and a permanently unstable condition
. Neither of these conditions are tolerated long by financial or political institutions. Unfortunately for us users, the corrective controls used by either of these institutions are not normally that subtle.

This should be quite interesting to watch. Also, there are probably quite a few "business opportunities" in the above if you're in the right place at the right time with the right tools.

Thoughts?

joat: 12:00:00 30 Aug 2005


Mon, 29 Aug 2005

Blog 29 Aug
I've been having a lot of trouble with my BlogRoll of late. Anyone visiting the site may have noticed (I'm not understating) extremely long load times. In other words, the page stalls while loading the Infosec blogroll.

Does anyone have any suggestions for alternate services? I'd like to keep the same basic information-presentation but, barring that, I'm willing to try out just about anything.

joat: 12:00:00 29 Aug 2005


Sun, 28 Aug 2005

Squidly1 28 Aug
If you're going to ToorCon, I recommend Squidly1's talk on alternate uses for the PSP. Ask her about using her PSP to find the hidden AP at SANS.

joat: 12:00:00 28 Aug 2005


NSA IAM/IEM 28 Aug
I'll echo Richard's recommendation about the NSA's IAM and IEM certifications: if you "do" assessments, the certs are a very-nice-to-have.

joat: 12:00:00 28 Aug 2005


Sat, 27 Aug 2005

Once more into the bitch (err... breach?) 27 Aug
(heh) This time the fire is over on Dana's blog. Remind me to put "responsible disclosure" on the list of things never to talk about again?

joat: 21:30:00 27 Aug 2005


Xpire 27 Aug
This is almost a year old but is interesting (for me) in that it references some old work of mine concerning the OpenFuck exploit. Found during some vanity surfing.

joat: 12:00:00 27 Aug 2005


Fri, 26 Aug 2005

DNS MITM attacks 26 Aug
SANS has a paper discussing a man-in-the-middle attack on DNS.

joat: 12:00:00 26 Aug 2005


Thu, 25 Aug 2005

Dorothy Denning 25 Aug

joat: 20:30:00 25 Aug 2005


Wed, 24 Aug 2005

Caffeinated Security 24 Aug
Here's another interesting blog: Caffeinated Security.

joat: 20:30:00 24 Aug 2005


Tue, 23 Aug 2005

Porn pirates 23 Aug
You'd think the name "joatblog" would be pretty darn unique, wouldn't you? Another thing that I found out via vanity surfing is that some porn jerks (FG4/DF4) are "borrowing" key names, using them as hostnames within their domain and are hosting porn sites behind them. For those that want to know more, substitute "joatblog" for "MYBLOG" in the following string (keep the underscores) and go search Google for that phrase: "cyberspace_MYBLOG_hopefully".

If this blog were part of a business, I'd have a legal action available. As it is, I can only (legally) remain pissed.

joat: 12:00:00 23 Aug 2005


Mon, 22 Aug 2005

Forensics forms 22 Aug
It struck me as a bit odd that part of the homework (tonight was the first class) was to search for forms used in collecting digital evidence (use of the term "computer forensics" has been formally "frowned upon").

After a 15-minute Google search, it's amazing. Everybody, including their mother and her Bingo friends, has some form of computer forensics (sorry Rob) book or course. Very few of those sites, other than law enforcement, provides any tools or support.

The assignment is actually to find a number of processes used to support the creation and maintenance of the chain of custody, and discuss them. This could get interesting.

joat: 21:30:00 22 Aug 2005


Sun, 21 Aug 2005

PSK 21 Aug
The Penguin Sleuth Kit (PSK) is a Knoppix-based Linux distro with tools not only for computer forensics but quite a few network troubleshooting and monitoring tools.

Note: Users of this kit should also read the disclaimers on the site if the use is intended for legal/LEO purposes.

joat: 12:00:00 21 Aug 2005


Sat, 20 Aug 2005

Myfip 20 Aug
For those that missed it (a few days ago), LURHQ has an analysis of the Myfip worm.

joat: 12:00:00 20 Aug 2005


Fri, 19 Aug 2005

Ethereal 19 Aug
Here is a SANS paper which discusses the simple traffic analysis using Ethereal.

joat: 12:00:00 19 Aug 2005


Thu, 18 Aug 2005

YMD (Yet More Drama) 18 Aug
I may be reading more into it than I should be but here's more drama over the .xxx situation. I can't help but think that the finger pointing up the hill is meant more to point at someone else's dirty laundry than their (ICANN) own.

joat: 20:30:00 18 Aug 2005


Wed, 17 Aug 2005

Quote 17 Aug
From class today:

"Firewalls cannot block stupidity." - Dennis Lee

joat: 16:40:02 17 Aug 2005


Standardization 17 Aug
Just a topic that was brought up earlier this week. Standardization of equipment and software across an enterprise allows that organization to operate more smoothly and (usually) more securely. However, many organizations forget that this is a "horizontal" rule but NOT a "vertical" rule. For example, all workstations should use the same make/model computer with the same version/patch level OS and configuration. However, the you should not be using the same hardware/software/configuration on your servers and perimeter equipment. You'd be amazed at the number of people that don't "get" this.

joat: 12:00:00 17 Aug 2005


Tue, 16 Aug 2005

Still more problems 16 Aug
Here is more of the ongoing issues involved with the .xxx domain. The author seems to be a bit naive in that he is suprised that objections exist. Not only are the porn site owners objecting (most sites are transient in nature and they don't want to pay $70 per domain per year), various government offices are also objecting.

joat: 22:29:06 16 Aug 2005


Mon, 15 Aug 2005

MD5 15 Aug
The media has once again created controversy by overstating a court decision. (this one) The court case was lost not due to the use of MD5, it was lost due to RTA's inability to "find an expert" to prove the pictures were not tampered with after they had been taken. This means one or more of the following conditions occurred:
  • they actually couldn't find anyone (although it's unlikely)
  • they couldn't find anyone that could explain MD5 in simple terms that would indicate that the liklihood that the traffic infraction actually occurred. Hint: think DNA evidence. You will always hear "probabilities" discussed when lawyers discuss DNA. Yes, there are collisions in MD5 number space. The probability of forgery goes down very fast if that "collision" has the same MD5 hash, looks like a picture, of the intersection in question, with the defendant's car passing through it, with the defendant's license plate in view, with the camera's timestamp (and other) data embedded in the picture.
  • the prosecution was unable to display the chain of evidence, in the form of being unable to prove when the MD5 hash was generated. The hash being embedded in the picture may actually cause a problem because it means that the picture was changed after it was taken, by the camera itself. However, this is a procedural problem, not a technical one, and would translate into the prosecution not being able to find anyone willing to take an oath to assert/support the accuracy of the data.

I doubt that MD5 hashing of traffic pictures will cease. Rather, I believe that how they're presented in court will change.

joat: 18:06:22 15 Aug 2005


Sun, 14 Aug 2005

No op 14 Aug
I'm on the road again this week, in the DC area, Vienna specifically.

joat: 14:00:00 14 Aug 2005


Enigma 14 Aug
Don't know where Rob got it but NetSec has a pointer to a very good paper on the Enigma machine.

joat: 12:00:00 14 Aug 2005


Sat, 13 Aug 2005

Wiki update 13 Aug
I've changed the format of the wiki slightly and have moved quite a few items from my house wiki. I have quite a bit of clean up to do so please bear with me.

joat: 14:00:00 13 Aug 2005


Python tutorials 13 Aug
From NetSec, free, online Python tutorials.

joat: 12:00:00 13 Aug 2005


Fri, 12 Aug 2005

3-button mice 12 Aug
Tony Finch point to this one. "Where are all the 3-button mice?" rings a bell with me.

The only reason you don't hear incessant whining from me is my secret (okay, now it's no longer a secret) cache of Logitech 3-button mice. I bought ten of those suckers when I heard Logitech was discontinuing the line. Also, I have to thank Hurd for donating a Sun Crossbow (3-button USB) to the collection, thereby prolonging the canibalism and jury-rigged repairs of those first ten mice. I wear 'em out fast.

joat: 12:30:00 12 Aug 2005


Everything Wireless 12 Aug
InfoSec Writers has a paper which has a pretty good overview of most of the issues involved with using Wi-Fi technologies.

joat: 12:00:00 12 Aug 2005


Thu, 11 Aug 2005

11 Aug
Richard Bejtlich has a post about a court case that a friend (Dave!) will probably find interesting. It's about a court case that the prosecution lost because they didn't understand current theory about MD5 collisions. In other words, they couldn't prove that a picture hadn't been tampered with after it had been taken.

In the same post, Richard points out a project by Harlan Carvey, who visits here now and then: the Forensic Server Project. His book also has a supporting site: http://www.windows-ir.com. I highly recommend visiting all three.

joat: 20:30:00 11 Aug 2005


Responsible non-disclosure 11 Aug
I'm pissed at Michael Lynn throwing a tanker truck of gasoline on the "responsible disclosure" pyre. It leads to overly politically correct announcements such as this. Little is gained from this type of announcement other than eEye getting a bit of "street cred". Announcements like that damage Microsoft's business by making organizations leery of server safety without giving them an idea of what to do to protect themselves.

Personally, I favor full disclosure but if we cannot live with that, I'd rather not hear about the vulnerability until such time that the vendor can comfortably talk about it. Many of the same arguments for "responsible disclosure" (I really dislike using that term), can be made for "responsible non-disclosure". Maybe the only way we can get back to the middle is to push the pendulum further away from center?

joat: 12:00:00 11 Aug 2005


Wed, 10 Aug 2005

Port-knocking theory 10 Aug
SANS has a paper on port-knocking which provides a bit more detail.

joat: 12:00:00 10 Aug 2005


Tue, 09 Aug 2005

Malicious agents 09 Aug
Here's a paper discussing the evolution of malicious agents (spyware and the like).

joat: 12:00:00 9 Aug 2005


Mon, 08 Aug 2005

I miss the peace and quiet 08 Aug
I guess my spammer decided to sell this URL to some n00b spammers 'cause I've got a ton of poker spam and Chinese porn spam in the comments queue. Oh well, the peace and quiet was nice while it lasted.

joat: 21:30:00 8 Aug 2005


Crypto latency 08 Aug
InfoSec Writers has a paper which discusses the latency added by using high-end encryption in VPN's.

joat: 12:00:00 8 Aug 2005


Sun, 07 Aug 2005

Interesting tools 07 Aug
I've seen some interesting new tools in the past few days:
  • Nepenthes - a honeypot tool
  • fwknop - using portknocking as an additional security feature

Update: I managed to fat-finger the URL for Nepenthes. Thanks goes to Gaetano Zappulla for correcting it. He also suggests taking a look at kojoney, SSH honeypot written in Python using the Twisted Conch libraries.

joat: 12:00:00 7 Aug 2005


Ouch 07 Aug
We already knew that CWS was bad. Now this:

It looks like the FBI is involved now. If your machine has ever been infected with CWS, consider any valuable information on it as compromised (i.e., at a minimum, change your passwords).

joat: 12:00:00 7 Aug 2005


Sat, 06 Aug 2005

WinPCAP 06 Aug
For those that use it, a new version of WinPCAP was announced yesterday.

joat: 19:30:00 6 Aug 2005


Fri, 05 Aug 2005

RUXCON 05 Aug
RUXCON (1-2 Oct) has a list of pending presentations. Looks like it'll be interesting.

joat: 20:30:00 5 Aug 2005


Thu, 04 Aug 2005

NSA 04 Aug
The Network Security and Architecture Lab (thought this was going to be about the other NSA, didn't you?) has a post about the Georgia Tech Honeynet Report which has some interesting screenshots of a homemade visualization tool. I often get quite frustrated with these topics as very few people are willing to share their visualization tools. Interesting screenshots though.

joat: 12:00:00 4 Aug 2005


Wed, 03 Aug 2005

New semester starting 03 Aug
This fall's class centers on computer (and possibly network?) forensics so expect a good number of forensic-related posts. Rob is also attempting to provoke me into teaching an IPv6 class.

joat: 12:30:00 3 Aug 2005


The Ten Commandments 03 Aug
Brian Warshawsky has a piece on the Ten Commandments of System Administration. He posted the tenth one, of which I'm a firm believer, on June 27. I wrote a SANS paper for log reduction based on this commandment. Entertaining and rules-to-live-by at the same time.

joat: 12:00:00 3 Aug 2005


Tue, 02 Aug 2005

Henning Schulzrinne 02 Aug
If you dig a little at Henning Schulzrinne's (Professor and Chair, Columbia's Dept. of Computer Science) Internet Technical Resources page, you come across some valuable listings of network tools.

joat: 12:00:00 2 Aug 2005


Mon, 01 Aug 2005

Gergely Erdelyi 01 Aug
Gergely Erdelyi has written a number of papers. He has the following available here:
  • Cleaning up the Mess - Time to redefine disinfection?
  • Chasing Ghosts? - Return of the Stealth Malware
  • Hide 'n Seek - Anatomy of Stealth Malware
  • Digital Genome Mapping - Advanced Binary Malware Analysis

joat: 12:00:00 1 Aug 2005


Podcast list 01 Aug
Finally got around to compiling the list of podcasts that people listen to. See it here (in the Wiki). If you want to add to the list, e-mail 'em to me.

joat: 12:00:00 1 Aug 2005


robtex